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MERKELS & ACQUISITIONS 
OR 
LOCUSTS AND LABOR LAW: 
WHAT’S REALLY “PLAGUING” CROSS-
BORDER M&A IN GERMANY? 
[A]nd out of the smoke dropped locusts which were given 
the powers that scorpions have on earth: they were 
forbidden to harm any fields or crops or trees and told only 
to attack any men who were without God’s seal on their 
foreheads. They were not to kill them, but to give them 
pain. . . . When this happens, men will long for death and 
not find it anywhere; they will want to die and death will 
evade them. 
 To look at, these locusts were like horses armored for 
battle. . . . That was the first of the troubles. . . .1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In May and June of 2006, Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, came 
to America for meetings with various leaders of American business.2 
Merkel intended to make a “big push to ramp up U.S. investment in 
Germany.”3 Forbes.com proclaimed her the World’s Most Powerful 
Woman and said, “Angela Merkel has a message for American companies: 
‘Germany is open for business.’”4 
These efforts by Merkel to encourage business growth so early in her 
tenure as Chancellor5 are not surprising. Described regularly by the media 
as “business friendly,”6 Merkel ran largely on a platform of promises to 
stimulate the “sluggish”7 German economy.8 During her campaign, Merkel 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 9 Revelation 9:3–7. 
 2. Tatiana Serafin, The Most Powerful Woman in the World, FORBES.COM, Sept. 1, 2006, 
http://www.forbes.com/2006/08/31/angela-merkel-power_cz_ts_06women_0831merkel.html. 
 3. Id. 
 4. The World’s Most Powerful Women, FORBES.COM, Aug. 31, 2006, 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/11/06women_The-100-Most-Powerful-Women_land.html. 
 5. Merkel was elected November 22, 2005. See Richard Bernstein, Merkel Takes Office in 
Germany and Announces Coalition Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2005, at A11. 
 6. See, e.g., The Beginning of the End?, EUR. REP., Sept. 21, 2005; Mitra Thompson, 
Healthcare Reforms on Hold as New German Chancellor Appointed, WORLD MARKETS RES. 
CENTER, Oct. 13, 2005 (describing Merkel as “big business-friendly”). 
 7. Int’l Monetary Fund Country Report No. 06/17, Germany: Selected Issues, Jan. 2006, at 
70, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr0617.pdf. See also Ben Aris, 
Western Europe: Germany—The Slow Road to Recovery—Although Business and Confidence Is 
Up Regarding Germany’s Prospects For Recovery This Year, Members of the Public and the 
Mittelstand Remain Unconvinced, THE BANKER, Apr. 1, 2006, at 56 (suggesting that, although 
some signs point to an economic “upswing” in Germany, “[n]one of the macroeconomic ailments 
that the ‘sick man of Europe’ has been suffering from have disappeared”). 
 8. See, e.g., Vanessa Drucker, Turning Point, GLOBAL FIN. MAG., June 2006, at 27. 
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made it clear that she intended to accomplish this “heal[ing of] the sick man 
of Europe”9 by ushering in a host of reforms intended to encourage business 
growth.10 Doing this would, according to her free-market way of thinking,11 
stimulate the economy.12 
Assuming that Merkel’s “opening” of Germany to American business13 
is related to her overall goal of spurring economic recovery by encouraging 
German business growth,14 the question is how intimately she will connect 
the two. One way that she might consider using the one to accomplish the 
other would be to open German companies to takeovers from American 
companies or other investors. As numerous commentators have pointed out, 
an open, strong takeover market that facilitates cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A)15 is one way to accomplish such a goal.16 Given that 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Heather Stewart, Business & Media: Iron Frau With a Tinpot Plan for Germany: Angela 
Merkel’s Ideas Aren’t New and Her Proposals Don’t Go Far Enough, THE OBSERVER, Sept. 11, 
2005, at 4. “The sick man of Europe” is a phrase coined by Russian Tsar Nicholas I to refer to the 
ailing Ottoman Empire. Since then, it has come to be applied to a European economy that is 
economically stagnant and seemingly failing. See The Real Sick Man of Europe, 
ECONOMIST.COM, May 19, 2005, available at http://www.economist.com/displaystory. 
cfm?story_id=3987219. Since the 1990’s, it has been a favorite descriptor of post-unification 
Germany. Id. 
 10. See Stewart, supra note 9, at 4. 
 11. Free-marketeers generally have the view that economic growth will reach its ideal level 
with minimal interference by government in businesses’ affairs and dealings with each other. See, 
e.g., Murray N. Rothbard, Free Market, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, available 
at http://www.econlib.org/library/enc/FreeMarket.html. 
 12. Id. Rothbard states: 
A common charge against the free-market society is that it institutes “the law of the 
jungle,” of “dog eat dog[.]” . . . On the contrary, . . . [t]he peaceful market competition 
of producers and suppliers is a profoundly cooperative process in which everyone 
benefits, and where everyone’s living standard flourishes (compared to what it would 
be in an unfree society. 
Id. 
 13. See The World’s Most Powerful Women, supra note 4, and accompanying text. 
 14. This is only an assumption, as Merkel refused all interviews during the trip. According to 
her “right-hand man, [however,] . . . Merkel used the meetings to promote the research and high-
tech skills in Bavaria as on par with Silicon Valley, in addition to showcasing other potential 
markets in Germany.”  See Serafin, supra note 2. 
 15. “[A] cross-border M&A transaction is a transaction in which the target company [the one 
being acquired] and the acquiring company [the buyer] are from different countries.”  Kathy Lien, 
Mergers and Acquisitions: Another Tool for Traders, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, Oct. 12, 2005, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/05/MA.asp. 
 16. See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Book Review: European Corporate Law and National 
Divergences: The Case of Takeover Regulation, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 867, 882 
(2004) (suggesting that, in any debate about takeover regulation, scholars should address the 
“economic pressure experienced by mature industrial and post-industrial states [at least the 
“industrial” category would include Germany] to develop innovative means for economic . . . 
growth,” the inference being that takeover regulation is very intertwined with economic growth). 
See also Jeffrey M. Peterson, Unrest in the European Commission: The Changing Landscape and 
Politics of International Mergers for United States Companies, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 377, 405 
(2002) (“There are no winners with protectionism. Protectionist measures are not beneficial to 
Europe, as European industry cannot compete in world markets if it is fenced in by protectionist 
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there is no shortage of interest in German companies from foreign, 
including American, buyers,17 at first glance Merkel appears to be well-
positioned to allow cross-border acquisitions by American purchasers assist 
her in accomplishing both her economy-stimulation and increasing-
American-business goals. And indeed, Merkel has indicated that she would 
like to relax certain German laws that are significant barriers to the 
development of a freer German market.18 
Unfortunately, certain moves in 2006 by the German legislature, as well 
as public comments by high-ranking political officials,19 indicate that not all 
of Germany is as open to encouraging foreign investment, particularly via 
cross-border acquisition, as Merkel may be.20 First, and perhaps most 
significantly, in July 2006 Germany enacted national legislation to 
implement the Thirteenth Directive of the European Union on Takeover 
Regulation, the European Commission legislation aimed at harmonizing 
“rules on takeovers in the European Union.”21 The goal of such 
harmonization was to make cross-border takeovers, in particular “hostile” 
ones, easier within the European Union.22 However, because of sustained 
opposition to original provisions of the Directive that would effect this goal, 
                                                                                                                 
measures.”). As Charlie McCreevy, the European Commissioner for the Internal Market noted, 
there is “a direct correlation between openness and prosperity.”  See Bad for Europe: Flag-
wrapped Protectionism is Thwarting the EU’s Economic Potential, THE TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 
28, 2006, at 17. While McCreevy was referring to openness within the EU, proponents of a strong 
takeover market would assert that openness in general to cross-border takeovers should be 
encouraged, particularly when a country is trying to boost economic growth. 
 17. See, e.g., Michael Wang, Germany Enjoys an M&A Fest—Year’s Deal Value to Top $96 
Billion, as Financial Sector Shines, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2005, at C8 (noting some very large 
deals involving non-German purchasers of German companies in 2005). Cross-border deals (those 
involving purchasers from one country buying a company in another) have generally been on the 
rise in recent years. See Dennis K. Berman & Jason Singer, Blizzard of Deals Heralds an Era of 
Megamergers—Ample Credit, Foreign Rivals and High Commodity Prices Propel Push for 
Global Reach, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2006, at A1. 
 18. See, e.g., Jonathan Braude, Days of the Locust, THEDEAL.COM, July 22, 2005, 
http://www.thedeal.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=TheDeal/TDDArticle/TDPrinterFriendl
y&c=TDDArticle&ArtID=1121176502234&cid=1121176502234&bn=/images/weekly/NewsRevi
ew_FIN.gif (contrasting Merkel and her party’s stated goals of, for example, making layoffs 
easier, with the current landscape that legally requires a prospective buyer to elicit significant—
and often, ultimately fatal to an attempted acquisition—cooperation from labor factions). Braude 
describes Merkel’s party’s approach as “a nudge in the direction of freer markets.”  Id. 
 19. Specifically, or at least most famously, this refers to a comment by now Vice-Chancellor 
Franz Müntefering describing American private equity firms and hedge funds as “locusts who 
were ravaging German companies and destroying jobs.”  Braude, supra note 18. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Council Directive 2004/25, 2004 O.J. (L 142/12) 12-23 (EC), Preamble ¶ 29, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex [hereinafter the Directive]. The European Union will hereinafter be 
referred to as the EU. In European Union lawmaking, “[a] directive establishes Union policy.  It is 
then left to the member states to implement the directive in whatever way is appropriate to their 
[respective] national legal system[s].”  RALPH H. FOLSOM, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN UNION 
LAW 31 (2005).  This is why Germany had to enact its own legislation to implement the Directive. 
 22. See Peggy Hollinger & John Thornhill, Paris Prepares Sweetener for Italy, FIN. TIMES, 
Mar. 13, 2006, at 21. 
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particularly from Germany,23 the Directive is highly unlikely to achieve its 
desired ends in any significant measure.24 The German implementation of 
the Directive25 enshrined the country’s expected position26 on the Directive 
in German law, and suggests a Germany distinctly disinterested in opening 
its national companies to foreign purchasers.27 It leaves national companies 
free to opt out of the two provisions of the Directive perhaps most “aimed 
at . . . removing barriers to takeovers,”28 by “provid[ing] management with 
considerable flexibility . . . to take frustrating action[] against unsolicited 
takeovers.”29 This means that management averse to takeover by a U.S. 
bidder, for example, would have fairly free reign to reject a bid.30 
As a secondary matter, Merkel does not appear to have anything like 
unified support for her agenda of encouraging foreign—American or 
otherwise—investment in German companies, even within her governing 
                                                                                                                 
 23. John Plender, Europe Feels the Toxic Effect of Corporate Nationalism, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 6, 
2006, at 19 (“[T]he Germans and Swedes . . . were able to knock the stuffing out of Europe’s 
takeover directive.”); Tobias Buck, Setback for EU as Members Opt out of Takeover Rules, FIN. 
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at 6 (“[S]trong opposition from member states such as Germany and Sweden 
. . . ensured the draft law was severely watered down.”). 
 24. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 25. Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2004/25/EG des Europäischen Parliaments und des 
Rates vom 21.Apr. 2004 betreffend Übernahmeangebote (Übernahmerichtlinie-
Umsetzungsgesetz), July 8, 2006, BGBl. I at 1433 [hereinafter the German Implementation]. The 
German Implementation, art. 8. 
 26. See, e.g., A Map of Europe After the Takeover Directive: Firms Across the EU Detail the 
Local Variation in Implementation of the Takeover Directive, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July 1, 2006, at 
26 [hereinafter A Map of Europe After the Takeover Directive] (predicting how various Member 
States would implement the Directive); Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, The Takeover Directive: 
Implementation in Germany, Summary, July 2006, at 1, available at 
www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2006/15837.pdf (“The new legislation confirms the 
position Germany was expected to take on the Directive’s optional articles.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Bad for Europe: Flag-wrapped Protectionism is Thwarting the EU’s Economic 
Potential, supra note 16 (discussing European countries’ use of “loopholes” in the Directive to 
protect national industry). 
 28. Scott V. Simpson & Lorenzo Corte, EU Directive Fails to Harmonize Takeovers, THE 
GUIDE TO MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 2005, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 1, 2005, at 15. Furthermore, 
[a]dditional legislative activity is still needed in order to provide a framework for 
companies whose shareholders decide to opt in. The legislature will also need to clarify 
the requirements for a shareholder ‘opt in’ resolution, as well as provide a set of rules 
governing frustrating actions taken by those companies. 
Klaus Riehmer, Germany, in EUROPEAN TAKEOVERS: THE ART OF ACQUISITION 207, 212 
(Jeremy Grant ed. 2005). 
 29. Simpson & Corte, supra note 28, at 18. 
 30. There is reason to believe that Germany lobbied for making these provisions optional at 
least in part because of concern that, if mandatory, they might open German companies to 
takeover by unsolicited U.S. bidders, and German politicians, at least, felt that national industry 
needed protection. See Peterson, supra note 16, at 402 (“Klaus-Heiner Lehne, a German Christian 
Democratic MEP who was concerned that EU companies should have the chance to defend 
themselves against hostile bids from the United States, put many of the changes [that finally 
resulted in Articles 9 and 11 being optional] forward.”). 
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coalition.31 The most striking example of this is perhaps Franz Müntefering, 
former Chairman of the SPD32 and now Vice Chancellor and Federal 
Minister for Labor and Social Affairs.33 In 2005, Müntefering famously34 
referred to (depending on the account one reads) foreign investors,35 private 
equity36 and/or hedge funds,37 as “locusts.”38 Müntefering’s comments 
seemed to echo the sentiments of many of his leftist (especially trade-union-
friendly) brethren in Europe.39 German unions’ historical power in deciding 
                                                                                                                 
 31. This coalition is made up of the CDU, Merkel’s conservative party; the CSU, another 
conservative party; and the SPD, the left-leaning social democratic party. See BBCNEWS.CO.UK, 
German Coalition Agreement Signed, Nov. 18, 2005, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4449662.stm. Given the mix of political leanings within this 
“left-right coalition,” see Merkel Vows to Make Germany Economic Motor of Europe Again, AFX 
INTERNATIONAL FOCUS, Nov. 30, 2005, http://www.lexisnexis.com, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
she and her governing compatriots agree on fairly few issues. See, e.g., Tony Paterson, Main 
Parties Agree Merkel As Head of Grand Coalition, INDEP., Nov. 15, 2005, at 23. 
 32. Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany). For a 
brief English-language history, see HIGHBEAM ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1B1-378985.html. 
 33. Müntefering’s official (German-language) title is Bundesminister für Arbeit und Soziales. 
A brief biography of the Minister is available on the SPD website. See SPD.DE, 
http://www.spd.de/menu/1684138/. 
 34. Two years later these comments are still being repeated by both the media and Mr. 
Müntefering. See, e.g., Bertrand Benoit, German Deputy Stands by Call to Tackle Locusts, 
FT.COM, Feb. 14, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/55437712-bc4e-11db-9cbc-0000779e2340.html. 
Benoit writes, 
Asked how he feels about the [private equity firms as locust] metaphor, [Müntefering] 
grabs a metal grasshopper from a shelf and borrows from singer Edith Piaf. “I have no 
regret whatsoever. . . . It is a nice image, locusts that move into a field, eat it to the 
ground, and move on to the next without looking back. I think it was quite apt. 
Id. 
 35. Norma Cohen & Patrick Jenkins, Book By Ex-Bourse Chief May Upset Exchange, FIN. 
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, at 25. 
 36. Sharon Reier, Is Success Spoiling Private Equity?; Despite Fat Returns, Bigger Risks and 
Louder Critics Are Crashing the Party, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 27, 2007, at 16. 
 37. Ralph Atkins & Jeremy Grant, US Opposes ‘Fuzzy’ Voluntary Hedge Fund Code of 
Conduct, FIN. TIMES, June 18, 2007, at 17. 
 38. See, e.g., Michael Jivkov, ‘Mothers Use My Name to Frighten Their Children’; Quote 
Unquote The Most Interesting Quotes of the Year Tell Their Own Story; Business Operators 
Displayed the Usual Flamboyance This Year, and, For a Few, Plain Old-Fashioned Crookery, 
INDEP., Dec. 27, 2005, at 50; Reier, supra note 36, at 16. This note will focus primarily on 
opposition to private equity funds in Germany. 
 39. See Jean Eaglesham, UK Union Adds to Pressure for Curbs on Private Equity Firms, 
FT.COM, Feb. 18, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1b76af40-bf87-11db-9ac2-000b5df10621.html. 
The sentiment suggested here is that private equity firms are not concerned enough with the 
welfare of constituencies other than shareholders, in particular labor and the workers that it 
represents. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, Labour Deputy Leader Hopefuls Quizzed: Private Equity, 
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2007, at 2 [hereinafter Eaglesham, Labour Deputy Leader Hopefuls Quizzed] 
(“Labour’s deputy leadership candidates will this week be asked by one of the biggest unions to 
explain their stance on private equity, amid growing national and international pressure on 
politicians to take regulatory action against the sector.”). 
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the course of German business40 could pose a significant problem for 
Merkel’s plans of economic revitalization via encouragement of foreign 
investment.41 With a Vice Chancellor in power inclined to support their 
positions on such matters, the potential for labor to stymie Merkel’s efforts 
in this area is significant. 
Despite potential continued problems for foreign investors in the 
country, investors like private equity funds continue to insist they are 
interested in attempting to build a greater presence in the German market.42 
In one way this is surprising, given that much has been made of the need for 
changes to the country’s highly restrictive labor laws, which make hiring 
and firing of workers complicated and costly, and therefore, “investors’ 
lives most uncomfortable.”43 Nevertheless, Germany is of great interest to 
private equity firms.44 Ongoing restructuring by major German 
corporations, has in part entailed divestment of “underperforming or non-
core parts of their businesses,”45 allowing private equity purchasers to 
approach companies at the latter’s behest.46 Noting the divide between 
private equity firms’ interest in the country on the one hand, and labor laws 
that place restrictions on investors’ maneuverings on the other, Merkel 
indicated that she plans to institute changes to German law that would 
ideally encourage foreign, especially private equity, investment in German 
firms.47 Thus, while Müntefering and the unions may not be keen on this 
push, private equity and foreign investors generally have a friend in Merkel. 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See, e.g., Heather Stewart, Business: No Quick Fix for the German Malaise: Wrangles 
Over Employment Laws and Tax Rates Could Prevent the Radical Reforms Needed to Revitalise 
Europe’s Largest Economy, THE OBSERVER, Oct. 16, 2005, at 10. 
 41. See discussion supra pp. 199–201. 
 42. See, e.g., Angela Maier, German Private Equity to Lobby, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, at 8 
(“Private equity managers have . . . stepped up their efforts to win political acceptance.”  
Presumably this reflects their continued interest in investing in the country). 
 43. See, e.g., Braude, supra note 18. See also Charlie Wright, Senior Lawyers Brand EU Code 
Major Hurdle to German M&A, LEGAL WEEK, Dec. 16, 2004, available at 
http://www.legalweek.com/Articles/122466/Senior+lawyers+brand+EU+code+’major+hurdle’+to
+German.html (“Employment laws in Germany are . . . an impediment [to] . . . investors. They 
cannot be bothered to wade through [them] and it has been a major brake on German M&A.”)  
(Internal quotations omitted). 
 44. Oliver Felsenstein, Private Equity: Germany is Learning to Live With Locusts, LEGAL 
WEEK, July 20, 2006, available at http://www.legalweek.com/Articles/129901/Private+ 
Equity+Germany+is+learning+to+live+with+locusts.html (“There are a number of quantifiable 
factors that make Germany one of the most attractive places for private equity investments in 
Europe, if not the world.”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Examples of recent transactions include E.ON’s divestment of the Viterra Group to private 
equity firm Terra Firma, and Linde’s announcement of its intent to auction its materials-handling 
business. Id. 
 47. Translation of the Coalition Agreement Between the CDU, CSU and SPD, Nov. 11, 2005, 
at 69, available at http://www.spd.de/show/1683399/Koalitionsvertrag2005_engl.pdf. 
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The goal of this note is to use certain facets of German takeover law as 
a lens to examine the viability of Merkel’s stated48 goal of increasing 
American investment in Germany. In particular, the question this note seeks 
to address is whether Merkel can achieve her goal of increasing foreign 
investment in light of the resistance she is likely to meet from important 
forces in the German socio-political landscape (especially from certain 
members of her coalition and powerful union forces). Part II of this note 
examines the current M&A environment in Germany, with particular focus 
on the Directive, and Germany’s implementation thereof, an indicator that 
Merkel is up against a legislature inclined to protect national business from 
foreign takeovers.49 This Part concludes that the effect the German 
Implementation will have on opening Germany to foreign investors’ 
acquisitions of German companies will be negligible at best.50 Part III 
suggests, however, that while the Directive may not have the effect of 
opening Germany to foreign investors by encouraging hostile cross-border 
acquisitions, Germany’s government might still be able to encourage some 
form of ‘investment through cross-border acquisition.’ Specifically, though 
highly unpopular with politicians like Müntefering and labor officials,51 
private equity firms may be just the type of investors that Merkel should 
“invite” into the country.52 This is because such investors tend to be 
friendly53 (as opposed to hostile) purchasers, so in this respect they are a 
different kind of buyer than the ones that the German Implementation 
intended to keep away from national companies. Though the restrictive 
labor laws pose a serious barrier to such investment,54 there may be useful 
European models of labor laws elsewhere on the Continent that protect 
workers while still allowing buyers of companies the freedom they need to 
downsize and restructure staffing to create more successful firms. 
Especially promising is the Danish “flexicurity” system, which Part III 
examines, ultimately concluding that flexicurity could serve as a useful 
model for the German legislature in considering reformation of its own 
labor laws. Part IV attempts to draw some conclusions about the likelihood 
of changes in the near future and whether Germany’s ‘American-business-
                                                                                                                 
 48. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 49. See discussion infra Part II. 
 50. Simpson & Corte, supra note 28, at 18 (suggesting that, because relatively little about 
German takeover law has changed, there will not be any noticeable difference in U.S. acquisition 
of German companies precipitated by the German Implementation). 
 51. See Eaglesham, Labour Deputy Leader Hopefuls Quizzed, supra note 39, at 2. 
 52. As already noted, see supra note 47 and accompanying text, Merkel in fact intends to try to 
do this anyway, despite the opposition she faces. 
 53. Andrew Geoghegan, Coles Myer Refuses Takeover Offer, ABC TRANSCRIPTS (Australia), 
Sept. 7, 2006 (“Private equity firms by nature are generally not willing to make hostile takeover 
bids. They much prefer to do things with board approval.”). 
 54. See Wright, supra note 43. See also discussion infra Part III. 
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friendly’ Chancellor,55 can manage to welcome American or other foreign 
investors.56 
II. THE DIRECTIVE 
A. HISTORY AND REALIZATION: A ROAD PAVED WITH GOOD 
INTENTIONS, BUT ULTIMATELY LEADING NOWHERE? 
Passage of the Directive was hard-won.57 Fourteen years in the 
making,58 the final Directive represents a compromise on a number of 
issues.59 By nearly all accounts, the Directive’s main goals, to harmonize 
and clarify national regulations regarding takeovers within the EU,60 and to 
create a “level playing field for takeover bids in the EU,”61 ultimately 
failed.62 Because “its two most important provisions,”63 i.e., those that 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See Serafin, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 56. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
 57. Marco Ventoruzzo, Europe’s Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover Regulation: 
Regulatory Means and Political and Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 171, 174 (2006) 
(“Passage of the . . . Directive . . . is no minor event.”). 
 58. As Christian Kirchner and Richard Painter point out, “Attempts to harmonize takeover law 
in Europe started in 1974 with a first draft—proposal for a Takeover Directive of the 
Commission,” but it was not until 1990 that the European Commission adopted an amended 
version of a proposal first presented in 1989. See Christian Kirchner & Richard Painter, Takeover 
Defenses Under Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German 
Takeover Law: Comparison and Recommendations for Reform, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 451, 455–56 
(2002). 
 59. EU Eases the Way For Merger Deals Across Borders—Compromise Legislation Protects 
Rights of Workers And Minority Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2004, at A7 (noting 
compromise that had to be reached before passage on workers’ rights issues). A favorite descriptor 
of the final version of the Directive is that it was “watered down” significantly from its initial 
form. See, e.g., Susie Mesure, EU Directive Could Cause Takeover Chaos, INDEP., May 30, 2006, 
at 34; Tobias Buck, Setback for EU as Members Opt Out of Takeover Rules, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 
2006, at 6; and Andrew Bulkeley & Paul Whitfield, France, Germany Propose ‘Poison Pill’, 
THEDEAL.COM, Feb. 17, 2006, http://www.thedeal.com/servlet/ ContentServer? 
cid=1140027926883&pagename=TheDeal%2FTDDArticle%2FTDStandardArticle&c=TDDArtic
le&bn=/images/headers/LAW_REGULATION.gif. 
 60. “It is necessary to create Community-wide clarity and transparency in respect of legal 
issues to be settled in the event of takeover bids and to prevent patterns of corporate restructuring 
within the Community from being distorted by arbitrary differences in governance and 
management cultures.”  Pre-amble of the Directive, supra note 21, at Paragraph (3). 
 61. The level playing field description is a favorite among commentators on the Directive. See, 
e.g., Jaap Winter, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of the European Takeover Directive, in 
EUROPEAN TAKEOVERS: THE ART OF ACQUISITION, supra note 28, at xxv, xxvi; Ventoruzzo, 
supra note 57, at 210. 
 62. See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, The Political Economy of Merger Regulation, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 
1, 16 (“[T]he Directive as passed achieves little by way of harmonization, instead setting forth 
certain minimum standards.”); Harmut Krause, Keine gleichen Rahmenbedingungen für 
Übernahmen; Harmonisierungsziel in Europa verfehlt—Deutsche Gesellschaften werden 
benachteiligt—Dringender Gestaltungsbedarf, BÖRSEN-ZEITUNG, June 21, 2006, at 2; and Simon 
F.T. Cox, Takeover Makeover, UTILITY WEEK, July 14, 2006, at 20 (“It is now clear that the 
European Takeover Directive has failed to create uniform takeover rules across Europe.”). 
 63. Bagchi, supra note 62, at 16. 
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would achieve the “aim . . . [of] phasing out of all defence mechanisms,”64 
are optional, the European Commission essentially gave Member States 
carte blanche not to change their takeover laws in a fashion that would 
make their national industrial companies more open to takeover by foreign 
concerns.65 
This tendency to protect national businesses is not surprising. The 
composition of the EU, as a confederation of independent nations, arguably 
invites a certain amount of protectionism.66 This protectionism is played out 
in the business/takeover context in the form of “corporate nationalism.”67 
Because “[t]he corporation reflects a bundle of relationships that include 
owners, managers, suppliers, creditors, and customers,”68 a takeover of a 
corporation will have some effect on each such group involved with a 
target, some of which may be adverse.69 In the context of a cross-border 
transaction the target and acquiring firms are not in the same State 
(country), the result being that “the legislature of the state of the target 
corporation has an incentive to allow defensive measures . . . in order to 
favor its national constituencies.”70 
Interestingly, until recently the ability to defend national corporations 
from (especially hostile) takeovers in Europe was hardly necessary. In the 
1990’s only 1.3% of all tender offers were hostile bids in the EU.71 This is 
in large part attributable to “the historically more permissive attitude toward 
the regulation of technical barriers, such as pre- and post-bid defences.”72 
Particularly popular as a hostile bid defense were provisions in corporate 
charters that “ha[d] as their primary purpose to ward off interference from 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on Takeover Bids, 2003/C 208/15, Sept. 3, 2003 
[hereinafter European Commission Opinion]. 
 65. As of March 2006, when a number of Member States had not yet enacted legislation 
implementing the Directive, only Latvia, Lithuania and Greece had suggested they would “apply 
both provisions and therefore make takeovers easier.”  Buck, supra note 59, at 6. 
 66. See, e.g., TIMOTHY BAYCROFT, NATIONALISM IN EUROPE 1789–1945, at 84 (1998). 
Baycroft states, 
The European world view . . . [is] heavily influenced by . . . the belief that the nation is 
the only legitimate source of power, . . . that one’s own nation has inherent value above 
and beyond that of other nations—putting it first in matters of policy—and finally that 
defence of its glory and honor are essential. 
Id. 
 67. John Plender, Europe Feels the Toxic Effect of Corporate Nationalism, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 6, 
2006, at 19. See also Peterson, supra note 16, at 390. 
 68. JAMES D. COX, THOMAS LEE HAZEN AND F. HODGE O’NEAL, CORPORATIONS, § 4.10 
(2002).  
 69. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 57, at 178 (Noting that takeovers can have various (and 
varying) effects on directors, managers, shareholders, employees and “providers”). 
 70. Id. at 179. 
 71. Jeremy Grant, Takeovers and the Market for Corporate Control, in EUROPEAN 
TAKEOVERS: THE ART OF ACQUISITION (Jeremy Grant ed.), at 1, 10. 
 72. Id. 
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outsiders.”73 Secondly, (Continental) European ownership structures are 
traditionally characterized by strong controlling shareholders with “either 
de facto or absolute control of the corporation.”74 For example, in Germany 
as of 2002, 31 of the 100 largest publicly traded companies were still 
family-owned/controlled.75 This highly concentrated form of ownership 
lends itself to resistance of hostile takeovers, even when such a takeover 
might realize greater shareholder value:76 If one homogenous (familial, 
financial or otherwise) group stands to lose control over an enterprise, 
which control it has long enjoyed, it is unlikely to yield to outside pressure 
to sell.77 When paired with the relatively lax regulation of bid defenses (and 
therefore a corresponding ease of employment of such defenses by 
management), European companies were probably viewed by potential 
investors as being worth approaching only in friendly bid situations that 
were likely to succeed. 
It almost seems a wonder, in light of Europe’s highly varied,78 but 
generally anti-hostile, takeover landscape that the European Commission 
undertook to pass legislation with the goal of increasing pan-Continental 
hostile takeovers.79 Nevertheless, the lure of the benefits offered by a 
healthy takeover market, including a corporate governance function80 and 
“allow[ing] firms to take advantage of EU-wide economies of scope and 
scale”81 proved too strong a lure—hence the Directive’s ultimate passage, 
albeit not in the form that all observers would have liked to see it.82 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. at 16. Grant lists such provisions as allowance of staggered boards, voting caps and 
restrictions on share transfers that, for example might keep control out of the hands of an 
“unfriendly” outsider. 
 74. Ventoruzzo, supra note 57, at 179. See also Grant, supra note 71, at 10–12. 
 75. Grant, supra note 71, at 12, exhibit 1.4. 
 76. The notion that takeovers may often increase or release the value of a firm has been widely 
supported and commented upon. See, e.g., Ventoruzzo, supra note 57, at 177 (“Takeovers—and in 
particular hostile ones—seem to increase . . . shareholders’ wealth.”); Grant, supra note 71, at 4 
(describing takeovers as an “[e]ffective corporate governance mechanism” that ensures capital is 
put to its most valuable uses by management, lest shareholders decide to sell their firms to an 
owner that will use said capital more effectively). 
 77. Ventoruzzo, supra note 57, at 178 (“[I]n every takeover a conflict of interest arises among 
who will be prejudiced by the success of the acquisition—this group includes subjects in control 
of the target corporation—and who will benefit from it.”). 
 78. See Scott Mitnick, Cross-Border Mergers & Acquisitions in Europe: Reforming Barrier to 
Takeovers, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 683, 684–85 (2001) (“The legal framework for takeovers 
in Europe is as varied as the languages and cultural traditions.”). 
 79. Grant, supra note 71, at 5. 
 80. See, e.g., MB, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, § 5E.06 (2006) (describing how “[t]he 
possibility of an unwanted tender offer may serve as a spur to management to improve its 
performance” if a company’s stock valuation is lower than it should be because its management is 
perceived as being inefficient). 
 81. Grant, supra note 71, at 5. 
 82. Jaap Winter notes, for example, that “Mr. Bolkestein, the European Commissioner in 
charge of securing agreement on the Directive in the Council and Parliament, has suggested that 
the Directive is not worth the paper on which it is printed.”  Winter, supra note 61, at xxv. See 
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The problem in passing the Directive was partially that the European 
Commission proposed the more recent versions in a particularly hostile83 
climate vis-à-vis opening national companies to takeovers. The last failed 
iteration, defeated in 2002, came directly on the heels of some theretofore 
exceedingly rare—but, unfortunately for the European Commission, very 
high-profile—hostile bids for major companies in certain European 
Member States.84 The hostile takeover of German telecommunications firm 
Mannesmann—at the time, Germany’s largest company by market 
capitalization85—was arguably a catalyst in getting Germany to draft what 
became the WpÜG.86 As one Germany-based practitioner put it, “German 
companies used to think of themselves as fortresses. . . . Then Vodafone-
Mannesmann happened and their perspectives changed overnight: they were 
no longer predators but potential preys.”87 By 2001, Germany was working 
to defeat a mandatory provision in the then-current draft of the Directive 
that would have prohibited management implementation of defensive 
tactics88 while simultaneously drafting its own, and first ever mandatory,89 
takeover code that widened defensive tactics available to German 
businesses in the event of a hostile takeover.90 This code, the WpÜG, took 
effect in January of 2002;91 it was amended to “conform” with the Directive 
as of July 2006,92 and makes neither of the Directive provisions that would 
have accomplished the “phasing out of all defence mechanisms”93 
mandatory for German firms. 
                                                                                                                 
also Tobias Buck, supra note 59 (quoting a Europe-based lawyer, saying the Directive was 
ultimately a “disappointment”). 
 83. No pun intended.  
 84. Specifically, the Vodafone-Mannesmann hostile takeover—the first successful one in 
Germany (see, e.g., Grant, supra note 71, at 10)—happened in 2000 and “provided some 
momentum for the enactment of German takeover legislation [the WpÜG, infra note 91] in 2002.”  
Simpson & Corte, supra note 28, at 17–18. The LVMH/Gucci takeover battle (involving luxury 
goods maker LVMH’s ultimately thwarted battle for control of Gucci) also happened shortly 
before this time, beginning in 1999 and finally reaching resolution in 2004. See Grant, supra note 
71, at 25–29. 
 85. David Fairlamb & Jack Ewing, Auf Wiedersehen, Germany Inc., BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 21, 
2000, at 64. 
 86. See supra note 84. 
 87. Bertrand Benoit, Effects of Hostile Takeover Still Being Felt in Germany Vodafone-
Mannesmann Case Study of a Clash of Ethos, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at 13. 
 88. See Kirchner & Painter, supra note 58, at 460, 463. 
 89. See, e.g., id. at 463 (“German industry . . . for years operated under a voluntary Takeover 
Code.”). 
 90. Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate 
Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 31, 66–67 (2005). 
 91. Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz, December 20, 2001, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I 
[BGBl. I] at 3822 [(Securities Acquisition and Takeover Law; hereinafter WpÜG]. 
 92. The German Implementation, supra note 25, at 1426. 
 93. See European Commission Opinion, supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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B. THE GREAT (OR NOT-SO-GREAT) COMPROMISE: 
ARTICLES 9 AND 11 
The two Articles of the Directive aimed at placing restrictions on the 
actions a company’s board can take to frustrate takeover offers94 are 
Articles 9 and 11.95 Article 9 of the Directive, or the “Board Neutrality 
Rule,”96 requires that the board of a target company refrain from taking any 
frustrating defensive action “at least” between the time the board of the 
target company receives notification of intent by another party to launch a 
hostile bid and the time the “result of the bid is made public or lapses.”97 In 
other words, the board should not do anything that might “result in the 
frustration of the bid . . . in particular [by] issuing any shares which may 
result in a lasting impediment to the offeror’s acquiring control of the 
company.”98 However, pursuant to Article 9(3) of the Directive, decisions 
that “form part of the normal course of the company’s business” need not 
be approved by shareholders.99 The dividing line between “normal course of 
business”-type actions and “extraordinary measures taken to frustrate a 
bid”100 is entirely unclear and may give target boards a way to circumvent a 
need to get shareholder approval before taking frustrating action in a bid.101 
Furthermore, because most of Article 9 is optional,102 it seems that those 
Member States with little or no history of giving shareholders particularly 
strong decision-making power are unlikely to dramatically change their 
laws governing this power dynamic now. 
The other article of the Directive that was highly contentious,103 and 
ultimately made optional, was Article 11.104 Article 11, or the 
“Breakthrough” Rule,105 provides that a board must get shareholder 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Ventoruzzo, supra note 57, at 194 (“[T]he European approach freezes directors’ powers 
once a public offer has been launched and requires any action that might adversely affect the 
outcome of the takeover to be approved by the shareholders.”). 
 95. See infra notes 99, 111 and accompanying text. 
 96. Ventoruzzo, supra note 57, at 208 (“[T]he Directive follows the British approach . . . by 
mandating that the board remain neutral in its actions.”). See also, Grant, supra note 28, at 50 
(“Board neutrality is an important principle of the European Takeover Directive.”). 
 97. The Directive, art. 9(2). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at art. 9(3). 
 100. Ventoruzzo, supra note 57, at 209. 
 101. Id. Ventoruzzo also notes that such behavior is likely to “lead to inefficient litigation,” id., 
a view echoed by Daniel Andrews, European M&A Will Take Longer and Cost More: 
Protectionism and Uneven Takeover Regimes Will Make European Mergers More Litigious and 
Protracted, but They Will Go Ahead, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July 1, 2006, at 25. See also Simpson & 
Corte, supra note 28, at 19 (predicting that European courts will have to mediate more in the 
European takeover landscape as countries adopt different variations of the Directive in their 
national legislation). 
 102. The Directive, supra note 21, at art. 12(1) (“Member States may reserve the right not to 
require companies . . . to apply Article 9(2) and (3).”). 
 103. See A Map of Europe After the Takeover Directive, supra note 26, at 26. 
 104. The Directive, supra note 21, art. 12(1). 
 105. Id. at art. 11. 
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approval before taking potentially frustrating action that controlling 
shareholders have already adopted and “entrenched”106 in the target’s 
articles of association, shareholders’ contracts and other “[extant] 
provisions designed to . . . make a successful hostile offer much less likely 
to succeed.”107 The purpose of Article 11 “has two major goals.”108 First, it 
aims to keep controlling shareholders and/or management from defeating 
offers that might be in the best interest of the company and its 
shareholders.109 Second, and “[m]ore importantly . . . the purpose of 
[Article 11] is to create a leveled playing field across Europe.”110 The 
problem, however, as with Article 9, is that adoption of Article 11 is 
optional for Member States.111 Because EU Member States can enact the 
Directive in a number of different ways, it “will not align takeover rules 
throughout Europe as originally expected.”112 
C. THE GERMAN IMPLEMENTATION 
Unsurprisingly,113 the German Implementation does not make following 
either Article 9 or Article 11 mandatory for national firms.114 To take the 
discussion perhaps seemingly out of order, this note first addresses Article 
11’s implementation in Germany. The reason for this is, in practice, this 
provision is unlikely to affect takeovers of German companies either way: 
Multiple-vote shares, the primary security whose effect would be de-
                                                                                                                 
 106. Ventoruzzo, supra note 57, at 210. 
 107. Id. at 209. See also The Directive, supra note 21, at arts. 11(2) and (3) (stipulating that 
“restrictions on the transfer of securities” in the target’s articles of association, “contractual 
agreements” between the target and its shareholders or among various of its shareholders, 
restrictions on voting rights, etc. will not apply to the offeror “during the time allowed for 
acceptance of the bid”). 
 108. Ventoruzzo, supra note 57, at 210. 
 109. Id. (“The first and obvious purpose is to limit the ability of the controlling group to 
entrench its position and fend off efficient offers.”).  The efficiency argument is one most 
frequently advanced in favor of a U.S.-style takeover market, where takeovers are viewed as ways 
to make companies more efficient. See, e.g., Sinclair Stewart, Cash, Low Interest Rates Fuel 
Canadian M&A Surge, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 12, 2005, at B3 (describing Asian companies’ desire 
to “become more efficient through mergers and takeovers”). 
 110. Ventoruzzo, supra note 57, at 210. Ventoruzzo goes on to give one of the more clear 
explanations of why the fabled ‘level[ed] playing field’ was necessary. The primary problem 
is/was that, because different Member States allowed for different takeover defense devices, 
“some Member States would be constrained by significant ‘external limitations’ [“the actions that 
can legally be taken according to applicable corporate laws”] . . . to the adoption of defensive 
schemes.” Id. Therefore, those Member States with more liberal takeover-defense laws left their 
national companies open to takeover from other nations than their European counterparts. 
 111. The Directive, supra note 21, at art. 12(1). 
 112. Simpson & Corte, supra note 28, at 15. 
 113. It is unsurprising because, as noted above, see supra note 88 and accompanying text, 
Germany put up much of the fight against these provisions when they were mandatory. 
 114. Articles 9 and 11 are “enacted” via Article 1(5)(16) of the German Implementation. The 
new § 33(a) of the WpÜG enacts Article 9 and largely allows companies to choose whether or not 
to opt into the provision. § 33(b) of the WpÜG enacts Article 11, with similar “optionality” for 
German companies. See the German Implementation, supra note 25, at 1428–29. 
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activated by implementation of an anti-break-through provision, are not 
generally allowed in German public companies.115 Article 11 of the 
Directive is “enacted” by giving German companies the opportunity to 
implement newly added § 33(b) of the WpÜG.116 As is the case with Article 
9, however, it is up to German companies to elect to adopt Article 11 at all, 
in this case by incorporating relevant provisions in their articles of 
association.117 Given the general tendency to protect themselves from 
takeover,118 it seems that few of Germany’s national companies will elect to 
adopt this rule. 
The German Implementation of Article 9 of the Directive is slightly 
more noteworthy, if also unlikely to be widely adopted by German firms.119 
The German Implementation enacts Article 9 of the Directive by amending 
§ 33(a) of the WpÜG.120 Importantly (but unsurprisingly), however, it first 
indicates that German companies are free to decide not to opt in to the new 
provisions.121 If they do not opt in, the provisions of the WpÜG that were 
already in place restricting frustrating action, albeit in somewhat more 
limited measure, apply.122 If the “old” (non-Directive-based) rules apply, 
executives may do four things that might ultimately frustrate a bid. They 
may 
[take] actions that a prudent and conscientious manager of a company not 
subject to a public offer would have taken; . . . search for an alternative 
bid, [take] actions approved by the supervisory board of the target; and 
[take] actions subject to shareholders’ consent that the shareholders’ 
meeting of the target has authorized the managing board to take to 
frustrate a bid and that have been approved by the supervisory board of the 
target.123 
Any consent by shareholders authorizing management to take specific 
defensive measures expires within 18 months.124 
These four allowed actions by management subject to a takeover bid are 
arguably “rather extensive prohibition of frustrating action.”125 However, 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 26, at 2. 
 116. The German Implementation, supra note 25, at 1428. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See discussion supra pp. 207–08. 
 119. See discussion supra Part I. 
 120. The German Implementation, supra note 25, at 1428–29. 
 121. The German Implementation, supra note 25, at 1428. (“Die Satzung einer Zielgesellschaft 
kann vorsehen, dass § 33 keine Anwendung findet. In diesem Fall gelten die Bestimmungen des 
Absatzes 2.”  [The articles of association of a target company may provide that § 33 [of the 
WpÜG] does not apply. In such a case, the provisions of paragraph 2 apply.]). The upshot of this 
is, if the extant rules regarding takeover defense measures in Germany, enshrined in § 33 of the 
WpÜG, don’t apply, the new European rules do. 
 122. Id. 
 123. WpÜG, supra note 91, at § 33. English translation and concise explication provided by 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 26, at 1–2. 
 124. WpÜG, supra note 91, at 3831. 
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what a company’s management can do if a company opts into the European 
rules is even more limited. Under the European rules, management may, 
[take] actions approved by the shareholders’ meeting after the decision to 
launch an offer has been published; [take] actions falling within the 
normal business operations of the company; [take] actions not forming 
part of the normal business operations of the company, provided that such 
actions are intended to implement decisions taken before the publication 
of the decision to launch an offer and have partly been implemented; and . 
. . search for an alternative bid.126 
While there are some similarities between the European and pre-Directive 
German rules, the latter gives management broader room to maneuver in the 
event of a bid. Particularly noteworthy is the provision allowing actions that 
any “prudent and conscientious manager” would take. In Germany, where 
“stakeholder capitalism” has historically been the rule,127 it seems entirely 
possible that a prudent and conscientious manager would consider it part of 
his job to protect stakeholders/constituencies other than shareholders. This 
might even include management itself, and certainly the workers under it, 
as both groups might lose their jobs if a takeover is successful. Thwarting a 
bid in light of these considerations does not seem to go against the letter of 
the law, if it perhaps defies its spirit. 
Secondly, as one practitioner points out, even the legislation “meant to 
implement Article 9 of the Directive”128 uses language that “seems to be 
wider”129 than that actually used in the Directive. Specifically, the Directive 
allows management to take actions pursuant to decisions that “form part of 
the normal course of the company’s business.”130 The German 
Implementation, however, allows actions “forming part of the normal 
business operations of the company,” a term that “seems to go beyond what 
is permitted by the Directive.”131 While this may seem like a minor point 
interesting largely to linguistics wonks, it serves to further illustrate the 
spirit in which Germany drafted and enacted its implementing legislation: 
There remains a desire to continue to allow German management a fair 
amount of freedom in deciding to refuse advances on their enterprises. 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Clifford Chance, EVCA Tax & Legal Committee, Tax & Legal Update: Germany—
National Developments (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.evca.com/images/ 
attachments/tmpl_14_art_88_att_1036.pdf. 
 126. The German Implementation, supra note 25, at 1428; English translation from Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 26, at 2. 
 127. Germany’s Pay Law: Disclosure Is Right—But Anti-Business Rhetoric Is Futile, FIN. 
TIMES, May 20, 2005, at 18. See generally, Baums & Scott, supra note 90, and discussion infra. 
 128. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 26, at 2. 
 129. Id. 
 130. The Directive, supra note 21, at Art. 9(3). 
 131. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 26, at 2. The difference is between the word 
“Geschäftsbetrieb” and “Geschäftsverlauf,” in German, the former being the word used in the 
German Implementation but the latter more nearly translating the text of the Directive. Id. 
212 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
Given the German response (under Merkel’s rule, no less, at least as far 
as the national implementing legislation is concerned132) to the Directive, it 
may seem bizarre to suggest that the country is in fact ready to open its 
borders to foreign purchasers of its companies. However, evaluating 
Germany’s openness to foreign investment by takeover in its firms by only 
looking at its response to the Directive is too myopic an evaluation. There 
are other indicators that Germany will succeed in achieving greater 
openness to foreign purchasers of its firms if it so desires. Though it will 
not be via hostile takeovers from strategic buyers, as a full implementation 
of the Directive would have facilitated,133 it might be by encouraging 
investment by private equity buyers. 
III. A DELICATE BALANCE: REFORMING LABOR LAW, 
PROTECTING WORKERS AND ATTRACTING PRIVATE 
EQUITY 
As noted, Merkel stipulated in her Coalition Agreement that she intends 
to encourage private equity investment in Germany.134 Of particular 
importance to her success in this endeavor, however, will be finding a way 
to protect the social security that inheres in Germans’ views of “good” 
corporate governance. Germany adheres to what is commonly referred to as 
the “stakeholder” view of capitalism.135 This system of beliefs (held by 
much of Continental Europe) holds that more than shareholders’ interests 
must be considered in making business decisions.136 This philosophy stands 
in marked contrast to the classical American view of corporate law that puts 
the interests of shareholders above those of all others involved with a 
business.137 
The differences between the two systems are especially relevant in the 
M&A context, because when a business is taken over, the people connected 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Merkel was elected in November 2005. See supra note 5. The German Implementation 
was passed in July 2006. See the German Implementation, supra note 25, at 1426. 
 133. See generally Simpson & Corte, supra note 28. See also Ventoruzzo, supra note 57, at 210 
(referring to Article 11’s “Breakthrough Rule” as being “intended to neutralize some . . . anti-
takeover devices in the event of a hostile offer”). The reason for the connection between these 
defense-minimizing provisions and hostile offers is doubtless that, if an offer is not hostile—
especially if it has been solicited, for example—the board is less likely to try to defend against it 
because it would like the takeover to happen. 
 134. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 135. Timothy Garton Ash, There’s a Certain Comfort in Capitalism, ALBANY TIMES UNION, 
Feb. 27, 2007, at A11 (“[W]hat we have across Europe are multiple varieties of capitalism, from 
more liberal market economies like Britain and Ireland to more coordinated ‘stakeholder’ 
economies like Germany.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Joseph S. Spoerl, The Social Responsibility of Business, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 277, 
290–91 (1997). 
 137. See generally id. (outlining the differences between the stakeholder and shareholder 
capitalism models). The American capitalist philosophies are also commonly referred to as the 
“Anglo-Saxon” model. See, e.g., Mario Monti, What Germany and France Must Rediscover, FIN. 
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at 19. 
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with the target of such takeover are often adversely affected.138 Stakeholder-
model proponents are fundamentally concerned that, if takeover rules are 
relaxed so as to allow the market and its competitive pressures to dictate 
which businesses survive and which are taken over, the interests of 
stakeholders other than shareholders will not be taken into “adequate” 
consideration.139 At the same time, Merkel will need to somehow liberalize 
German labor law to achieve her stated140 goal of encouraging private 
equity investment in the country: As one commentator wrote, German labor 
law has been long viewed as “an impediment, . . . particularly with US 
private equity investors . . . [who] cannot be bothered to wade through 
[it].”141 Fortunately, Merkel perhaps need only “look North” at the Danish 
system of flexicurity, the labor market scheme employed in Denmark in 
recent years with great success in stimulating the economy and investment 
in the country’s businesses.142 Flexicurity’s unique combination of flexible 
labor markets and a large social security net for workers displaced by 
company changes would allow investors like private equity firms flexibility 
in restructuring companies, while placating people such as Müntefering, 
and his labor-friendly, stakeholder-capitalist cohorts. 
A. FLEXICURITY GENERALLY 
Flexicurity has three basic “pillars”143 known as the “Golden Triangle 
of flexicurity.”144 These are (i) ease of hiring and firing for employers, (ii) 
generous unemployment benefits and (iii) “active labor market policies.”145 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Michael Skapinker, Fair shares?, FIN. TIMES, June 11, 2005, at 18. Skapinker lists those 
likely to adversely affected by being associated with a takeover target as workers, pensioners and 
neighborhoods, for example. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Timothy L. Fort, Article: Corporate Makahiki: The Governing Telos of Peace, 38 
AM. BUS. L.J. 301, 314 (2001) (“[T]here has been a strong perception that takeovers tend to favor 
one group of stakeholders (i.e. executives and shareholders) to the disadvantage of 
nonshareholders such as bondholders and employees.”). 
 140. See supra notes 47, 134 and accompanying text. 
 141. Wright, supra note 43. 
 142. See, e.g., Denmark’s Labour Market: Flexicurity, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 2006, at 29 (noting 
that unemployment in Denmark is “at its lowest in over 30 years” and that “Denmark’s 
exceptional performance . . . has attracted much attention”). 
 143. Nils Bernstein, Lessons From the Danish Economy, THE BANKER, Mar. 1, 2006, at 8. 
 144. See Lee Jae-kap, Creating ‘Golden Triangle of Flexicurity’: Danish Model Combines 
Flexible Labor Market and Social Security, KOREA HERALD, Sept. 26, 2006, available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
 145. Id. The idea of active labor markets is a broad concept, but generally it involves a focus on 
training (or retraining) of workers displaced by their companies’ purchases and the like, and a 
fairly specific commitment on the part of government to reduce unemployment by getting workers 
back into the workforce as soon as possible. See, e.g., W. Norton Grubb, Norena Badway & 
Denise Bell, Community Colleges and the Equity Agenda: The Potentials of Non-Credit 
Education, 586 ANNALS 218, 240 n.18 (Mar. 2003), who explain 
While conceptions of active labor market policies vary, they usually include fiscal and 
monetary policy to reduce unemployment; labor matching efforts including job banks, 
sometimes career information and counseling, and apprenticeship policies; 
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More broadly, flexicurity can be described as “balancing flexibility and 
security,”146 by making hiring and firing of workers easier, but without 
removing social security nets.147 A number of articles suggest that 
flexicurity would be difficult to implement in any country other than 
Denmark.148 The reasons given for the purported difficulty of replication are 
various, but generally consist of such largely Denmark-specific (or so it is 
argued) factors as low debt and a budget surplus,149 a particularly close (and 
apparently, unusually friendly or cooperative) “dialogue between employers 
and unions that is not easily exportable to other countries,”150 and a cultural 
history of social equality and a belief that ‘the system’ should take care of 
everyone, not just a privileged few.151 The interesting point about all of 
these factors offered by nay-sayers as Denmark-specific attributes that 
would make flexicurity un-exportable is, they are actually not cultural 
attributes wholly missing in other European countries, including 
Germany.152 
B. ADAPTING FLEXICURITY TO GERMANY 
Any legislation aimed at encouraging U.S. investment in Germany 
should help foreign firms “establish a strong local presence and cultivate 
                                                                                                                 
unemployment insurance; income support for low-income individuals, including direct 
funding (like welfare policies) as well as tax credits; legislation covering organized 
labor, wages, and working conditions, including minimum wage laws and employment 
leaves; health and safety legislation; retirement policies; antidiscrimination policies for 
women and minority groups; some aspects of trade policy, including tariffs on goods 
assembled abroad and efforts to prevent the export of jobs; the use and potential 
creation of tripartite groups (including business, labor, and government) to plan 
policies; and manpower policy covering job training (but not education). 
Id. 
 146. Bulletin EU 3-2006, Presidency conclusions (5/10), available at 
http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/200603/i1006.htm. 
 147. See, e.g., David Corderi & Gustav Ranis, When Labor Loses Out to Trade, YALEGLOBAL 
ONLINE, Aug. 10, 2006, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=7963 (describing flexicurity 
as “a set of liberal policies for hiring and firing . . . [with a] generous system of carefully 
monitored unemployment benefits and funding for retraining displaced workers”). 
 148. See, e.g., Lee Jae-kap, supra note 144; Denmark’s Labour Market: Flexicurity, supra note 
142, at 29; Social Policy: Danish Flexicurity Model Would Be Hard to Emulate Everywhere, EUR. 
REP., May 30, 2006, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
 149. Social Policy: Danish Flexicurity Model Would Be Hard to Emulate Everywhere, supra 
note 148. 
 150. Denmark’s Labour Market: Flexicurity, supra note 144, at 29. 
 151. See Richard Karlgaard, The Scandinavian Model, FORBES, July 24, 2006, at 39. See also 
Bruce Stokes, All for One, One for All, NAT’L J., Mar. 4, 2006, at 33. 
 152. For example, Germany’s “Rheinland capitalist” model, which “stands for a market 
economy which is, although capitalist in principle, characterized by important social protections.” 
Marita Körner, German Labor Law in Transition, 6 GERMAN L.J. 805, 805–06 (2005), is clearly 
concerned with ensuring a social net similar to the one that would be provided by flexicurity is 
available to its citizens. 
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relationships.”153 Part of cultivating relationships in a country, if they are to 
be long-lasting and mutually satisfactory to both the foreign and the 
national parties, necessarily involves identifying and respecting that 
country’s cultural and legal peculiarities.154 National legislation aimed at 
facilitating foreign investments should show similar respect for cultural 
mores.155 It is therefore important to realize that in analyzing potential paths 
of reform, imposing U.S. (or, more broadly, “Anglo-Saxon”156) economic 
and social norms on Germany is probably not the ideal way to encourage 
the country to embrace investment from other nations.157 As Robert 
Kimmett noted, “[T]he United States is in no way trying to impose the U.S. 
economic model on Germany or any other country. Europe has plenty of 
successful economic growth stories . . . that provide useful lessons for 
reform.”158 As noted,159 one such successful economic growth story is 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Matthew Craft & Priya Malhotra, Germany Luring U.S. Private Equity, CORP. FIN. WK., 
Apr. 4, 2005, at 1. 
 154. As Terence Halliday noted, “In wine, as in law, terroir makes a discernible difference.”  
Terence Halliday, Remarks at the Brooklyn Journal of International Law Symposium: Bankruptcy 
in the Global Village—The Second Decade (Oct. 21, 2006). In other words, as not all varieties of 
grape will grow in all soil, so not all legal mechanisms that work well in one culture will work in 
others. See generally Trevor Buck & Shahrim Azura, The Translation of Corporate Governance 
Changes Across National Cultures: the Case of Germany, J. INT’L BUS. STUD., Jan. 1, 2005; 
Zumbansen, supra note 16, at 881. 
While the discussion on takeover regulation continues, it is important to bear in mind 
that an adequate assessment of the regulatory context and the political economy, from 
which any takeover regulation arises, must be built upon careful consideration of the 
different historical developments and political decisions that have shaped various 
regulatory regimes. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 155. See Karlgaard, supra note 151, at 39 (“[N]ational economies must be fitted to the 
culture.”). 
 156. Monti, supra note 137, at 19. 
 157. This would be true of any commentator of one nationality making recommendations for 
legislative or other reforms in another country. As a U.S. commentator, I note only my own 
potential biases. 
 158. Robert Kimmett, Reinvigorating the US-German Economic Partnership, Luncheon 
Keynote at American Council on Germany Conference, Jan. 13, 2006, available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js3081.htm. Another commentator goes so far as to say that 
Germany does not necessarily need any model for reform: 
The basic thesis . . . that France, Germany and Italy are all stuck in the mud, while the 
Nordic countries, plus the UK and Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain (up to a point) are 
much better at reforming both welfare systems and labour markets to encourage greater 
flexibility and lower unemployment is well worn. It is also rather smug. Germany does 
reform slowly, with an agonising consensual process. But the country’s impressive 
productivity, and recent economic acceleration, suggest that it may be getting some 
things right. 
Quentin Peel, A Most Unhappy Union: A Leading Social Theorist Has No Real Answers to 
Europe’s Problems, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006, at 29. Peel’s view is the minority one, however; 
far more sources suggest that Germany does need to make some changes to its labor markets, even 
if the sources fail to agree on how such changes should be implemented, and by whom. 
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Denmark, which has managed to encourage free trade and the flexible labor 
market that seems to accompany or possibly foster it, without giving up 
many aspects of social security so valued in Europe,160 including in 
Germany. 
The question is how Merkel might go about implementing aspects of 
flexicurity in Germany. On October 21, 2006, thousands of German 
workers and their representatives protested the government’s stated plans to 
raise consumers’ value-added taxes while cutting company taxes, with 
worker representatives complaining that such a move would “hurt workers’ 
incomes.”161 Significantly for the prospects of flexicurity implementation, 
however, the same group called on the government to “boost training.”162 If 
the government could convince such protesting groups that in fact a tax 
hike might make for an opportunity to do just this by providing funds to 
implement training programs, it might find that otherwise unpopular tax 
moves are not quite as detrimental to its reputation as they might otherwise 
be. In Denmark, “workers pay high taxes,”163 but do so in exchange for, in 
part, access to training and higher availability of jobs.164 Additionally, the 
high taxes contribute to the “generous unemployment pay,” which in turn 
(so far, at least) does not run out in part because workers are forced back 
into other jobs quickly.165 If German unemployment remains as steadily 
high as it is,166 German workers may find they will agree to a tax increase if 
they stand to benefit from it by retaining employment. 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See supra note 142. 
 160. Monti, supra note 137, at 19 (Noting that there is an “impression that the ‘Anglo-Saxon 
model’ . . . is the only one available if . . . Germany [is] to become more competitive . . . .” Monti 
goes on to note, however, that “there are some key elements of the ‘Nordic model’ . . . that could 
help . . . Germany . . . to achieve a high degree of social equity but in ways that are more 
consistent with economic efficiency and competitiveness”). See also Corderi & Ranis, supra note 
150 (suggesting that the Scandinavian countries “occupy a middle ground” between, on the one 
hand, Continental European countries, which tend to have rigid labor laws that prevent firing of 
workers, and the U.S. or U.K., both of which have a more liberal labor market and little social 
security). 
 161. Brian Parkin & Christiane Markwort, Thousands of Germans Protest Higher VAT and 
Healthcare Costs, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 21, 2006, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601100&sid=apx5tYZsiW1A&refer=germany. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Denmark’s Labour Market: Flexicurity, supra note 142, at 29. 
 164. Bernstein, supra note 143. 
 165. Denmark’s Labour Market: Flexicurity, supra note 142, at 29. 
 166. The German unemployment rate was at 9% as of July 2006. See Bertrand Benoit, German 
Unepmployment Rate Falls, But Skills Shortage Worsens, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at 6. In 
fairness to Merkel and accuracy, this number has indeed fallen since Merkel came to power. See 
Bertrand Benoit, Merkel Rides High on Falling Jobless Rates, FIN. TIMES, June 27, 2007, at 10. 
However, it represents the entire country’s unemployment rate, and does not reveal the enormous 
disparity between the states in the former East Germany, where unemployment is significantly 
higher (approaching 20%—”nearly twice the national average”).  See Tom Hundley, Few Births, 
Exodus Wilt East Germany, CHI. TRIB., June 18, 2007, at C1. 
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One major challenge, at least superficially, to implementing flexicurity 
in Germany may not even be tax-related. Rather, it seems likely that it will 
be convincing workers and their representatives that making hiring and 
firing easier (the “flex” (as in “flexibility”) part of flexicurity) as part of a 
long-term plan to ultimately reduce unemployment and increase 
employability is an acceptable strategy. The problem is that, “[from] a 
historical perspective, labor law is not an example for a flexible system . . . 
[because] the aim of labor law was to restrict the opportunity for the 
employer to destroy the security which labor law, as one of its prominent 
goals, has to guarantee.”167 Perhaps nowhere is this truer than in Germany, 
where the system of codetermination168 presents a real structural barrier 
with potential for causing conflict between workers and shareholders like 
private equity investors. The reason for this is, 
[C]odetermination . . . allocates control functions to agents whose 
positions are determined by their interests as employees, not as providers 
of capital or holders of cash flow rights. The interests of these agents may 
well be at odds with those of shareholders. For employees, the survival of 
the company, the protection of the workplace, as well as their wage and 
nonwage benefits are naturally of primary interest. Shareholders, by 
contrast, are likely to focus on the monetary value of their investment.169 
Therefore, without the support of works councils and the employee 
representatives on German supervisory boards, allowance for easy firing of 
employees is likely to be met with resistance. 
This does not mean that German workers will never be amenable to 
aspects of flexicurity. Because flexicurity also has as one of its goals 
maintenance of a significant social security net,170 it is less likely to 
completely rend apart the social safety net on which traditional Continental 
(including and especially German) labor law places such importance. 
Instead of guaranteeing a ‘job for life’ as the German system historically 
has,171 flexicurity instead provides social safety and security through 
generous unemployment benefits and “training and other measures to 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Rolf Birk, Europe: Labor Law Scholarship in France, Germany, and Italy: Some Remarks 
on a Difficult Question, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 679, 690 (2002). 
 168. Codetermination is, generally, a system wherein employees are represented “at the 
enterprise level through works councils” and the supervisory board level through employee 
representatives. Anthony Forsyth, The Transplantability Debate: Can European Social 
Partnership Be Exported to Australia?, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 305, 315 (2006). See also 
GERHARD WIRTH, MICHAEL ARNOLD & MARK GREEN, CORPORATE LAW IN GERMANY 117 
(2004). 
 169. Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model With Governance Externalities, 
in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 169 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 
1999) (internal citation omitted). 
 170. See discussion supra pp. 215–16. 
 171. See Körner, supra note 152, at 808 (“During the phase of Rhineland capitalism, life-long 
employment was the rule.”). 
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improve each jobless individual’s employment prospects.”172 Essentially, 
flexicurity just provides security after dismissal, not before or in order to 
pre-empt it. In this way, it might be viewed less as a reduction of benefits, 
but rather more as a ‘re-ordering’ of them. 
By establishing legislation that might encourage flexicurity’s 
development in Germany, the government has an opportunity to help 
redefine what its constituents place under the “job security” rubric. This is 
how flexicurity’s development in Germany might also relate to increased 
foreign (including U.S.) private equity investment in the country: 
[T]he reduction of unemployment is one of the principal arguments for 
changes in labor law. According to well accepted logic, it is the high level 
of labor protection that prevents employers from employing people (and 
foreign investors from investing in German corporations). On the other 
side of this coin, there is the idea that less anti-dismissal law . . . or [fewer] 
collective bargaining rights, could incite more employers to build up their 
workforce[s].173 
Assuming that reducing a workforce, at least over the short term, is often 
part of executing a private equity investment strategy,174 loosening some of 
the highly protective strictures of German labor law will encourage foreign 
investment in Germany.175 Furthermore as Körner notes, employers might 
actually employ more people, if they do not have to contend with such strict 
anti-dismissal and collective bargaining laws.176 Finally, numerous sources 
suggest that, over the long term, private-equity sponsored companies often 
see an increase in the number of workers they employ, and fare on the 
whole better than their non-private-equity-sponsored compatriots.177 
Therefore, while the short-term effects on easing the path to workforce 
reductions may make German labor nervous, the long-term effects may, on 
balance, be worth it. 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Diana Farrell, Sweden’s Balancing Lessons for Europe, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Sept. 25, 
2006, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/sep2006/gb20060922_333746.htm. 
 173. Körner, supra note 152, at 808 (emphasis added). 
 174. This is often the case. See, e.g., Grace Wong, LBO’s: What the Little Guy Should Fear, 
CNNMONEY.COM, July 25, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/07/25/news/companies/ 
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 175. See Wright, supra note 43. 
 176. Körner, supra note 152, at 808. 
 177. See, e.g., New Fuel for an Old Engine: Refinancing Corporate Germany, ECONOMIST, 
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Group: Developing European Private Equity, July 2006, available at 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
If Merkel truly means to “ramp up”178 U.S. investment in Germany, she 
will have to contend with a number of issues. Because her government and 
the one(s) that preceded it failed to accept a European takeover directive 
that would have increased cross-border M&A in Germany,179 this recent 
opportunity to open Germany to some forms of investment, especially 
strategic cross-border mergers, has probably passed. However, U.S. private 
equity firms, one of the “[f]oreign investors . . . vital to German companies’ 
financial revolution,”180 may be able to capitalize on the Merkel 
government’s “business-friendly”181 nature. There are few industrial or 
“strategic” buyers with whom they must compete,182 and their unique 
position as potential partners in running a business183 might make them 
attractive to German companies in ways that strategic buyers are not. 
Further, as generally friendly buyers184 that are also less likely to create the 
problems with redundancies that strategic buyers pose,185 private equity 
firms may, in some ways, make potential targets more comfortable with 
their approach. 
The problem for private equity firms in Germany is essentially two-
fold. From a public relations standpoint, they will have to find a way to 
burnish their reputations with politicians like Müntefering, who considers 
them “asset-stripping locusts,”186 and wishes to keep all (or at least most187) 
of them out of the country to the greatest extent possible. From a legal 
standpoint, they will have to rely on Merkel’s promise, enshrined in her 
coalition agreement188 to make Germany more open to private equity 
investment. While Merkel has started this process by working with her 
cabinet to propose tax reforms that would encourage private equity 
investment,189 she will have to do more than reform the tax laws to make 
private equity in Germany realize its full potential. Specifically, Germany 
should encourage transactions that involve management partnering with 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Serafin, supra note 2. 
 179. See supra Part II. 
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private equity firms, and liberalize its labor laws so that workers can be, if 
necessary, dismissed more easily from target companies. 
There are many who suggest that German labor authorities would never 
agree to policies that permit such flexibility in the labor markets.190 The 
key, however, is for the Merkel government to find a way it can convince 
its constituents, particularly workers, that liberalization of labor market 
policies need not mean a wholesale implementation of Anglo-Saxon free-
market ideals, devoid of the social protections that Germans (and other 
Europeans) view as arguably indispensable to their culture. The Danish 
“flexicurity” model, which provides flexibility with active labor market 
policies and a significant social safety net191 illustrates that it is possible to 
make dismissal of employees easier, while maintaining significant social 
security safeguards. This “third way”192 may need adjustment from one 
country to the next, particularly in Germany where the codetermination 
powers of German workers will have to be respected and worked around or 
with. But in its nod to the sanctity of the social market economy, that 
“specific notion of justice” held by Europeans193 that the market should be 
“fair to all participants, [with] . . . its rewards equitably distributed,”194 
flexicurity maintains a healthy distance from the Anglo-Saxon model’s 
criticized lack of social protections for the workers that market forces 
displace. If Germany’s government can begin to give private equity firms 
the breathing room they need to function in the country’s labor markets, and 
can do so without upsetting some of Germany’s more ingrained cultural 
sensitivities, it might find it keeps to its goals and lives up to its “American-
business friendly”195 reputation. 
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